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Abstract
The problem of making sequential decisions in unknown probabilistic environ-
ments is studied. In cycle t action yt results in perception xt and reward rt, where
all quantities in general may depend on the complete history. The perception xt and
reward rt are sampled from the (reactive) environmental probability distribution µ.
This very general setting includes, but is not limited to, (partial observable, k-th
order) Markov decision processes. Sequential decision theory tells us how to act in
order to maximize the total expected reward, called value, if µ is known. Reinforce-
ment learning is usually used if µ is unknown. In the Bayesian approach one defines
a mixture distribution ξ as a weighted sum of distributions ν∈M, whereM is any
class of distributions including the true environment µ. We show that the Bayes-
optimal policy pξ based on the mixture ξ is self-optimizing in the sense that the
average value converges asymptotically for all µ∈M to the optimal value achieved
by the (infeasible) Bayes-optimal policy pµ which knows µ in advance. We show
that the necessary condition that M admits self-optimizing policies at all, is also
sufficient. No other structural assumptions are made onM. As an example applica-
tion, we discuss ergodic Markov decision processes, which allow for self-optimizing
policies. Furthermore, we show that pξ is Pareto-optimal in the sense that there
is no other policy yielding higher or equal value in all environments ν ∈M and a
strictly higher value in at least one.
∗This work was supported by SNF grant 2000-61847.00 to Ju¨rgen Schmidhuber.
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1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning: There exists a well developed theory for reinforcement learn-
ing agents in known probabilistic environments (like Blackjack) called sequential decision
theory [Bel57, Ber95]. The optimal agent is the one which maximizes the future expected
reward sum. This setup also includes deterministic environments (like static mazes).
Even adversarial environments (like Chess or Backgammon) may be seen as special cases
in some sense [Hut00, ch.6] (the reverse is also true [BT00]). Sequential decision theory
deals with a wide range of problems, and provides a general formal solution in the sense
that it is mathematically rigorous and (uniquely) specifies the optimal solution (leaving
aside computational issues). The theory breaks down when the environment is unknown
(like when driving a car in the real world). Reinforcement learning algorithms exist for un-
known Markov decision processes (mdps) with small state space, and for other restricted
classes [KLM96, SB98, Ber95, KV86], but even in these cases their learning rate is usually
far from optimum.
Performance measures: In this work we are interested in general (probabilistic) en-
vironmental classes M. We assume M is given, and that the true environment µ is
in M, but is otherwise unknown. The expected reward sum (value) V pµ when following
policy p is of central interest. We are interested in policies p˜ which perform well (have
high value) independent of what the true environment µ∈M is. A natural demand from
an optimal policy is that there is no other policy yielding higher or equal value in all
environments ν ∈M and a strictly higher value in one ν ∈M. We call such a property
Pareto-optimality. The other quantity of interest is how close V p˜µ is to the value V
∗
µ of
the optimal (but infeasible) policy pµ which knows µ in advance. We call a policy whose
average value converges asymptotically for all µ∈M to the optimal value V ∗µ if µ is the
true environment, self-optimizing.
Main new results for Bayes-mixtures: We define the Bayes-mixture ξ as a weighted
average of the environments ν∈M and analyze the properties of the Bayes-optimal policy
pξ which maximizes the mixture value Vξ. One can show that not all environmental
classes M admit self-optimizing policies. One way to proceed is to search for and prove
weaker properties than self-optimizingness [Hut00]. Here we follow a different approach:
Obviously, the least we must demand fromM to have a chance of finding a self-optimizing
policy is that there exists some self-optimizing policy p˜ at all. The main new result of
this work is that this necessary condition is also sufficient for pξ to be self-optimizing. No
other properties need to be imposed on M. The other new result is that pξ is always
Pareto-optimal, with no conditions at all imposed on M.
Contents: Section 2 defines the model of agents acting in general probabilistic environ-
ments and defines the finite horizon value of a policy and the optimal value-maximizing
policy. Furthermore, the mixture-distribution is introduced and the fundamental linear-
ity and convexity properties of the mixture-values is stated. Section 3 defines and proves
Pareto-optimality of pξ. The concept is refined to balanced Pareto-optimality, showing
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that a small increase of the value for some environments only leaves room for a small
decrease in others. Section 4 shows that pξ is self-optimizing if M admits self-optimizing
policies, and also gives the speed of convergence in the case of finiteM. The finite horizon
model has several disadvantages. For this reason Section 5 defines the discounted (infinite
horizon) future value function, and the corresponding optimal value-maximizing policy.
Pareto-optimality and self-optimizingness of pξ are shown shown for this model. As an
application we show in Section 6 that the class of ergodic mdps admits self-optimizing
policies w.r.t. the undiscounted model and w.r.t. the discounted model if the effective
horizon tends to infinity. Together with the results from the previous sections this shows
that pξ is self-optimizing for erdodic mdps. Conclusions and outlook can be found in
Section 7.
2 Rational Agents in Probabilistic Environments
The agent model: A very general framework for intelligent systems is that of rational
agents [RN95]. In cycle k, an agent performs action yk∈Y (output) which results in a
perception or observation xk∈X (input), followed by cycle k+1 and so on. We assume
that the action and perception spaces X and Y are finite. We write p(x<k)=y1:k to
denote the output y1:k≡y1...yk of the agents policy p on input x<k≡x1...xk−1 and similarly
q(y1:k)=x1:k for the environment q in the case of deterministic environments. We call
policy p and environment q behaving in this way chronological. Note that policy and
environment are allowed to depend on the complete history. We do not make any mdp or
pomdp assumption here, and we don’t talk about states of the environment, only about
observations. In the more general case of a probabilistic environment, given the history
yx<kyk≡yx1...yxk−1yk≡y1x1...yk−1xk−1yk, the probability that the environment leads to
perception xk in cycle k is (by definition) ρ(yx<kyxk). The underlined argument xk in ρ is
a random variable and the other non-underlined arguments yx<kyk represent conditions.
1
We call probability distributions like ρ chronological. Since value optimizing policies
can always be chosen deterministic, there is no real need to generalize the setting to
probabilistic policies. Arbitrarily we formalize Sections 3 and 4 in terms of deterministic
policies and Section 5 in terms of probabilistic policies.
Value functions and optimal policies: The goal of the agent is to maximize future
rewards, which are provided by the environment through the inputs xk. The inputs
xk≡x
′
krk are divided into a regular part x
′
k and some (possibly empty or delayed) reward
rk∈ [0 , rmax].
2 We use the abbreviation
ρ(yx<kyxk:m) = ρ(yx<kyxk)·ρ(yx1:kyxk+1)· ... ·ρ(yx<myxm), (1)
1The standard notation ρ(xk|yx<kyk) for conditional probabilities destroys the chronological order and
would become quite confusing in later expressions.
2In the reinforcement learning literature when dealing with (po)mdps the reward is usually considered
to be a function of the environmental state. The zero-assumption analogue here is that the reward rk is
some probabilistic function ρ′ depending on the complete history. It is very convenient to integrate rk
into xk and ρ
′ into ρ.
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which is essentially Bayes rules, and ε=yx<1 for the empty string. The ρ-expected reward
sum (value) of future cycles k to m with outputs yk:m generated by the agent’s policy
p, the optimal policy pρ which maximizes the value, its action yk and the corresponding
value can formally be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Value function and optimal policy) We define the value of policy p
in environment ρ given history yx<k, or shorter, the ρ-value of p given yx<k, as
V pρkm(yx<k) :=
∑
xk:m
(rk+ ... +rm)ρ(yx<kyxk:m)|y1:m=p(x<m). (2)
m is the lifespan or initial horizon of the agent. The ρ-optimal policy pρ which maximizes
the (total) value V pρ :=V
pρ
1m(ε) is
pρ := argmax
p
V pρ , V
∗ρ
km(yx<k) := V
pρρ
km (yx<k). (3)
Explicit expressions for the action yk in cycle k of the ρ-optimal policy p
ρ and their value
V ∗ρkm(yx<k) are
yk = argmax
yk
∑
xk
max
yk+1
∑
xk+1
... max
ym
∑
xm
(rk+ ...+rm)·ρ(yx<kyxk:m), (4)
V ∗ρkm(yx<k) = maxyk
∑
xk
max
yk+1
∑
xk+1
... max
ym
∑
xm
(rk+ ...+rm)·ρ(yx<kyxk:m). (5)
where yx<k is the actual history.
One can show [Hut00] that these definitions are consistent and correctly capture our
intention. For instance, consider the expectimax expression (5): The best expected reward
is obtained by averaging over possible perceptions xi and by maximizing over the possible
actions yi. This has to be done in chronological order ykxk...ymxm to correctly incorporate
the dependency of xi and yi on the history. Obviously
V ∗ρkm(yx<k) ≥ V
pρ
km(yx<k) ∀p, especially V
∗
ρ ≥ V
p
ρ ∀p. (6)
Known environment µ: Let us now make a change in conventions and assume that µ is
the true environment in which the agent operates and that we know µ (like in Blackjack).3
Then, policy pµ is optimal in the sense that no other policy for an agent leads to higher
µ-expected reward. This setting includes as special cases deterministic environments,
Markov decision processes (mdps), and even adversarial environments for special choices
of µ [Hut00]. There is no principle problem in determining the optimal action yk as long
as µ is known and computable and X , Y and m are finite.
3If the existence of true objective probabilities violates the philosophical attitude of the reader he may
assume a deterministic environment µ.
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The mixture distribution ξ: Things drastically change if µ is unknown. For (param-
eterized) mdps with small state (parameter) space, suboptimal reinforcement learning
algorithms may be used to learn the unknown µ [KLM96, SB98, Ber95, KV86]. In the
Bayesian approach the true probability distribution µ is not learned directly, but is re-
placed by a Bayes-mixture ξ. Let us assume that we know that the true environment µ
is contained in some known set M of environments. For convenience we assume that M
is finite or countable. The Bayes-mixture ξ is defined as
ξ(yx1:m) =
∑
ν∈M
wνν(yx1:m) with
∑
ν∈M
wν = 1, wν > 0 ∀ν ∈M (7)
The weights wν may be interpreted as the prior degree of belief that the true environment
is ν. Then ξ(yx1:m) could be interpreted as the prior subjective belief probability in
observing x1:m, given actions y1:m. It is, hence, natural to follow the policy p
ξ which
maximizes V pξ . If µ is the true environment the expected reward when following policy p
ξ
will be V p
ξ
µ . The optimal (but infeasible) policy p
µ yields reward V p
µ
µ ≡V
∗
µ . It is now of
interest (a) whether there are policies with uniformly larger value than V p
ξ
µ and (b) how
close V p
ξ
µ is to V
∗
µ . These are the main issues of the remainder of this work.
A universal choice of ξ andM: One may also ask what the most general classM and
weights wν could be. Without any prior knowledge we should include all environments
in M. In this generality this approach leads at best to negative results. More useful
is the assumption that the environment possesses some structure, we just don’t know
which. From a computational point of view we can only unravel effective structures
which are describable by (semi)computable probability distributions. So we may include
all (semi)computable (semi)distributions in M. Occam’s razor tells us to assign high
prior belief to simple environments. Using Kolmogorov’s universal complexity measure
K(ν) for environments ν one should set wν ∼ 2
−K(ν), where K(ν) is the length of the
shortest program on a universal Turing machine computing ν. The resulting policy pξ
has been developed and intensively discussed in [Hut00]. It is a unification of sequential
decision theory [Bel57, Ber95] and Solomonoff’s celebrated universal induction scheme
[Sol78, LV97]. In the following we consider generic M and wν . The following property of
Vρ is crucial.
Theorem 1 (Linearity and convexity of Vρ in ρ) V
p
ρ is a linear function in ρ and
V ∗ρ is a convex function in ρ in the sense that
V pξ =
∑
ν∈M
wνV
p
ν and V
∗
ξ ≤
∑
ν∈M
wνV
∗
ν where ξ(yx1:m) =
∑
ν∈M
wνν(yx1:m)
Proof: Linearity is obvious from the definition of V pρ . Convexity follows from V
∗
ξ ≡V
pξ
ξ =∑
νwνV
pξ
ν ≤
∑
νwνV
∗
ν , where the identity is definition (3), the equality uses linearity of V
pξ
ρ
just proven, and the last inequality follows from the dominance (6) and non-negativity of
the weights wν . ⊓⊔
One loose interpretation of the convexity is that a mixture can never increase performance.
In the remainder of this work µ denotes the true environment, ρ any distribution, and ξ
the Bayes-mixture of distributions ν∈M.
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3 Pareto Optimality of policy pξ
The total µ-expected reward V p
ξ
µ of policy p
ξ is of central interest in judging the per-
formance of policy pξ. We know that there are policies (e.g. pµ) with higher µ-value
(V ∗µ ≥V
pξ
µ ). In general, every policy based on an estimate ρ of µ which is closer to µ than
ξ is, outperforms pξ in environment µ, simply because it is more taylored toward µ. On
the other hand, such a system probably performs worse than pξ in other environments.
Since we do not know µ in advance we may ask whether there exists a policy p with better
or equal performance than pξ in all environments ν∈M and a strictly better performance
for one ν∈M. This would clearly render pξ suboptimal. We show that there is no such
p.
Theorem 2 (Pareto optimality) Policy pξ is Pareto-optimal in the sense that there is
no other policy p with V pν ≥V
pξ
ν for all ν∈M and strict inequality for at least one ν.
Proof: We want to arrive at a contradiction by assuming that pξ is not Pareto-optimal,
i.e. by assuming the existence of a policy p with V pν ≥V
pξ
ν for all ν∈M and strict inequality
for at least one ν:
V pξ =
∑
ν
wνV
p
ν >
∑
ν
wνV
pξ
ν = V
pξ
ξ ≡ V
∗
ξ ≥ V
p
ξ
The two equalities follow from linearity of Vρ (Theorem 1). The strict inequality follows
from the assumption and from wν > 0. The identity is just Definition 1(3). The last
inequality follows from the fact that pξ maximizes by definition the universal value (6).
The contradiction V pξ >V
p
ξ proves Pareto-optimality of policy p
ξ.⊓⊔
Pareto-optimality should be regarded as a necessary condition for an agent aiming to be
optimal. From a practical point of view a significant increase of V for many environments
ν may be desirable even if this causes a small decrease of V for a few other ν. The
impossibility of such a “balanced” improvement is a more demanding condition on pξ
than pure Pareto-optimality. The next theorem shows that pξ is also balanced-Pareto-
optimal in the following sense:
Theorem 3 (Balanced Pareto optimality)
∆ν := V
pξ
ν − V
p˜
ν , ∆ :=
∑
ν∈M
wν∆ν ⇒ ∆ ≥ 0.
This implies the following: Assume p˜ has lower value than pξ on environments L by a total
weighted amount of ∆L :=
∑
λ∈Lwλ∆λ. Then p˜ can have higher value on η∈H:=M\L, but
the improvement is bounded by ∆H :=|
∑
η∈Hwη∆η|≤∆L. Especially |∆η|≤w
−1
η maxλ∈L∆λ.
This means that a weighted value increase ∆H by using p˜ instead of p
ξ is compensated
by an at least as large weighted decrease ∆L on other environments. If the decrease is
small, the increase can also only be small. In the special case of only a single environment
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with decreased value ∆λ, the increase is bound by ∆η ≤
wλ
wη
|∆λ|, i.e. a decrease by an
amount ∆λ can only cause an increase by at most the same amount times a factor
wλ
wη
.
For the choice of the weights wν∼2
−K(ν), a decrease can only cause a smaller increase in
simpler environments, but a scaled increase in more complex environments. Finally note
that pure Pareto-optimality (Theorem 2) follows from balanced Pareto-optimality in the
special case of no decrease ∆L≡0.
Proof: ∆≥0 follows from ∆=
∑
νwν [V
pξ
ν −V
p˜
ν ]=V
pξ
ξ −V
p˜
ξ ≥0, where we have used linearity
of Vρ (Theorem 1) and dominance V
pξ
ξ ≥V
p
ξ (6). The remainder of Theorem 3 is obvious
from 0≤∆=∆L−∆H and by bounding the weighted average ∆η by its maximum.⊓⊔
4 Self-optimizing Policy pξ w.r.t. Average Value
In the following we study under which circumstances4
1
m
V p
ξν
1m →
1
m
V ∗ν1m for m→∞ for all ν ∈M. (8)
The least we must demand from M to have a chance that (8) is true is that there exists
some policy p˜ at all with this property, i.e.
∃p˜ : 1
m
V p˜ν1m →
1
m
V ∗ν1m for m→∞ for all ν ∈M. (9)
Luckily, this necessary condition will also be sufficient. This is another (asymptotic)
optimality property of policy pξ. If universal convergence in the sense of (9) is possible
at all in a class of environments M, then policy pξ converges in the sense of (8). We will
call policies p˜ with a property like (9) self-optimizing [KV86]. The following two Lemmas
pave the way for proving the convergence Theorem.
Lemma 1 (Value difference relation)
0 ≤ V ∗ν − V
p˜
ν =: ∆ν ⇒ 0 ≤ V
∗
ν − V
pξ
ν ≤
1
wν
∆ with ∆ :=
∑
ν∈M
wν∆ν
Proof: The following sequence of inequalities proves the lemma:
0 ≤ wν [V
∗
ν −V
pξ
ν ] ≤
∑
ν wν [V
∗
ν −V
pξ
ν ] ≤
∑
ν wν [V
∗
ν −V
p˜
ν ] =
∑
ν wν∆ν ≡ ∆
In the first and second inequality we used wν ≥ 0 and V
∗
ν −V
pξ
ν ≥ 0. The last inequality
follows from
∑
νwνV
pξ
ν =V
pξ
ξ ≡V
∗
ξ ≥V
p˜
ξ =
∑
νwνV
p˜
ν . ⊓⊔
We also need some results for averages of functions δν(m)≥0 converging to zero.
4Here and elsewhere we interpret am→ bm as an abbreviation for am−bm→0. limm→∞bm may not
exist.
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Lemma 2 (Convergence of averages) For δ(m) :=
∑
ν∈Mwνδν(m) the following holds
(we only need
∑
νwν≤1):
i) δν(m) ≤ f(m) ∀ν implies δ(m) ≤ f(m).
ii) δν(m)
m→∞
−→ 0 ∀ν implies δ(m)
m→∞
−→ 0 if 0 ≤ δν(m) ≤ c.
Proof: (i) immediately follows from δ(m)=
∑
νwνδν(m)≤
∑
νwνf(m)≤f(m). For (ii) we
choose some order on M and some ν0∈M large enough such that
∑
ν≥ν0wν ≤
ε
c
. Using
δν(m)≤c this implies ∑
ν≥ν0
wνδν(m) ≤
∑
ν≥ν0
wνc ≤ ε.
Furthermore, the assumption δν(m)→0 means that there is an mνε depending on ν and
ε such that δν(m)≤ε for all m≥mνε. This implies
∑
ν≤ν0
wνδν(m) ≤
∑
ν≤ν0
wνε ≤ ε for all m ≥ max
ν≤ν0
{mνε} = : mε.
mε<∞, since the maximum is over a finite set. Together we have
δ(m) ≡
∑
ν∈M
wνδν(m) ≤ 2ε for m ≥ mε ⇒ δ(m)→ 0 for m→∞
since ε was arbitrary and δ(m)≥0. ⊓⊔
Theorem 4 (Self-optimizing policy pξ w.r.t. average value) There exists a sequence
of policies p˜m, m=1,2,3,... with value within ∆(m) to optimum for all environments ν∈M,
then, save for a constant factor, this also holds for the sequence of universal policies pξm,
i.e.
i) If ∃p˜m∀ν : V
∗ν
1m − V
p˜mν
1m ≤ ∆(m) =⇒ V
∗µ
1m − V
pξmµ
1m ≤
1
wµ
∆(m).
If there exists a sequence of self-optimizing policies p˜m in the sense that their expected
average reward 1
m
V p˜mν1m converges to the optimal average
1
m
V ∗ν1m for all environments ν∈M,
then this also holds for the sequence of universal policies pξm, i.e.
ii) If ∃p˜m∀ν :
1
m
V p˜mν1m
m→∞
−→ 1
m
V ∗ν1m =⇒
1
m
V p
ξ
mµ
1m
m→∞
−→ 1
m
V ∗µ1m.
The beauty of this theorem is that if universal convergence in the sense of (9) is possible
at all in a class of environments M, then policy pξ converges (in the sense of (8)). The
necessary condition of convergence is also sufficient. The unattractive point is that this is
not an asymptotic convergence statement for V p
ξµ
km of a single policy p
ξ for k→∞ for some
fixed m, and in fact no such theorem could be true, since always k≤m. The theorem
merely says that under the stated conditions the average value of pξm can be arbitrarily
close to optimum for sufficiently large (pre-chosen) horizon m. This weakness will be
resolved in the next subsection.
Proof: (i) ∆ν(m)=f(m) implies ∆(m)=f(m) by Lemma 2(i). Inserting this in Lemma
1 proves Theorem 4(i) (recovering the m dependence and finally renaming f❀∆).
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(ii) We define δν(m):=
1
m
∆ν(m)=
1
m
[V ∗ν −V
p˜
ν ]. Since we assumed bounded rewards 0≤r≤
rmax we have
V ∗ν ≤ mrmax and V
p˜
ν ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆ν ≤ mrmax ⇒ 0 ≤ δν(m) ≤ c := rmax.
The premise in Theorem 4(ii) is that δν(m)=
1
m
[V ∗ν1m−V
p˜ν
1m]→0 which implies
0 ≤ 1
m
[V ∗ν1m − V
pξν
1m ] ≤
1
wν
∆(m)
m
= 1
wν
δ(m) → 0.
The inequalities follow from Lemma 1 and convergence to zero from Lemma 2(ii). This
proves Theorem 4(ii). ⊓⊔.
In Section 6 we show that a converging p˜ exists for ergodic mdps, and hence pξ converges
in this environmental class too (in the sense of Theorem 4).
5 Discounted Future Value Function
We now shift our focus from the total value V1m, m→∞ to the future value (value-to-go)
Vk?, k→∞. The main reason is that we want to get rid of the horizon parameter m. In
the last subsection we have shown a convergence theorem for m→∞, but a specific policy
pξ is defined for all times relative to a fixed horizon m. Current time k is moving, but m
is fixed5. Actually, to use k→∞ arguments we have to get rid of m, since k≤m. This is
the reason for the question mark in Vk? above.
We eliminate the horizon by discounting the rewards rk❀ γkrk with
∑∞
i=1γi <∞ and
letting m→∞. The analogue of m is now an effective horizon heffk which may be defined
by
∑k+heff
k
i=k γk ∼
∑∞
i=k+heff
k
γk. See [Hut00, Ch.4] for a detailed discussion of the horizon
problem. Furthermore, we renormalize Vk∞ by
∑∞
i=kγi and denote it by Vkγ. It can be
interpreted as a future expected weighted-average reward. Furthermore we extend the
definition to probabilistic policies pi.
Definition 2 (Discounted value function and optimal policy) We define the γ dis-
counted weighted-average future value of (probabilistic) policy pi in environment ρ given
history yx<k, or shorter, the ρ-value of pi given yx<k, as
V piρkγ (yx<k) :=
1
Γk
lim
m→∞
∑
yxk:m
(γkrk+ ...+γmrm)ρ(yx<kyxk:m)pi(yx<kyxk:m)
with Γk :=
∑∞
i=kγi. The policy p
ρ is defined as to maximize the future value V piρkγ :
pρ := argmax
pi
V piρkγ , V
∗ρ
kγ := V
pρρ
kγ = maxpi
V piρkγ ≥ V
piρ
kγ ∀pi.
5A dynamic horizon like m❀mk=k
2 can lead to policies with very poor performance [Hut00, Ch.4].
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Remarks:
• pi(yx<kyxk:m) is actually independent of xm, since pi is chronological.
• Normalization of Vkγ by Γk does not affect the policy p
ρ.
• The definition of pρ is independent of k.
• Without normalization by Γk the future values would converge to zero for k→∞ in
every environment for every policy.
• For an mdp environment, a stationary policy, and geometric discounting γk∼γ
k, the
future value is independent of k and reduces to the well-known mdp value function.
• There is always a deterministic optimizing policy pρ (which we use).
• For a deterministic policy there is exactly one yk:m for each xk:m with pi 6=0. The
sum over yk:m drops in this case.
• An iterative representation as in Definition 1 is possible.
• Setting γk=1 for k≤m and γk=0 for k>m gives back the undiscounted model (1)
with V pρ1γ =
1
m
V pρ1m.
• Vkγ (and w
ν
k defined below) depend on the realized history yx<k.
Similarly to the previous sections one can prove the following properties:
Theorem 5 (Linearity and convexity of Vρ in ρ) V
piρ
kγ is a linear function in ρ and
V ∗ρkγ is a convex function in ρ in the sense that
V piξkγ =
∑
ν∈M
wνk V
piν
kγ and V
∗ξ
kγ ≤
∑
ν∈M
wνk V
∗ν
kγ
where ξ(yx<kyxk:m) =
∑
ν∈M
wνk ν(yx<kyxk:m) with w
ν
k := wν
ν(yx<k)
ξ(yx<k)
The conditional representation of ξ can be proven by dividing the definition (7) of ξ(yx1:m)
by ξ(yx<k) and by using Bayes rules (1). The posterior weight w
ν
k may be interpreted as
the posterior belief in ν and is related to learning aspects of policy pξ.
Theorem 6 (Pareto optimality) For every k and history yx<k the following holds: p
ξ
is Pareto-optimal in the sense that there is no other policy pi with V piνkγ ≥V
pξν
kγ for all ν∈M
and strict inequality for at least one ν.
Lemma 3 (Value difference relation)
0 ≤ V ∗νkγ − V
p˜ikν
kγ =: ∆
ν
k ⇒ 0 ≤ V
∗ν
kγ − V
pξν
kγ ≤
1
wν
k
∆k with ∆k :=
∑
ν∈M
wνk∆
ν
k
The proof of Theorem 6 and Lemma 3 follows the same steps as for Theorem 2 and Lemma
1 with appropriate replacements. The proof of the analogue of the convergence Theorem
4 involves one additional step. We abbreviate “with µ probability 1” by w.µ.p.1.
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Theorem 7 (Self-optimizing policy pξ w.r.t. discounted value) For anyM, if there
exists a sequence of self-optimizing policies p˜ik k=1,2,3,... in the sense that their expected
weighted-average reward V p˜ikνkγ converges for k→∞ with ν-probability one to the optimal
value V ∗νkγ for all environments ν ∈M, then this also holds for the universal policy p
ξ in
the true µ-environment, i.e.
If ∃p˜ik∀ν : V
p˜ikν
kγ
k→∞
−→ V ∗νkγ w.ν.p.1 =⇒ V
pξµ
kγ
k→∞
−→ V ∗µkγ w.µ.p.1.
The probability qualifier refers to the historic perceptions x<k. The historic actions y<k
are arbitrary.
The conclusion is valid for action histories y<k if the condition is satisfied for this action
history. Since we usually need the conclusion for the pξ-action history, which is hard to
characterize, we usually need to prove the condition for all action histories. Theorem
7 is a powerful result: An (inconsistent) sequence of probabilistic policies p˜ik suffices to
prove the existence of a (consistent) deterministic policy pξ. A result similar to Theorem
4(i) also holds for the discounted case, roughly saying that V p˜i−V ∗ =O(∆(k)) implies
V p
ξ
−V ∗= 1
ε
O(∆(k)) with µ probability 1−ε for finite M.
Proof: We define δν(k):=∆
ν
k=V
∗ν
kγ −V
p˜iν
kγ . Since we assumed bounded rewards 0≤r≤rmax
and V ∗νkγ is a weighted average of rewards we have
V ∗µkγ ≤ rmax and V
p˜iµ
kγ ≥ 0 ⇒ 0 ≤ δν(k) = ∆
ν
k ≤ c := rmax.
The following inequalities follow from Lemma 3:
0 ≤ V ∗µkγ − V
pξµ
kγ ≤
1
wµ
k
∆k =
1
wµ
k
δ(k)
?
→ 0 (10)
The premise in Theorem 7 is that δν(k)=V
∗ν
kγ −V
p˜iν
kγ →0 for k→∞ which implies δ(k)→0
(w.µ.p.1) by Lemma 2(ii). What is new and what remains to be shown is that wµk
is bounded from below in order to have convergence of (10) to zero. We show that
zk−1 :=
wµ
wµ
k
=
ξ(yx<k)
µ(yx<k)
≥ 0 converges to a finite value, which completes the proof. Let E
denote the µ expectation. Then
E[zk|x<k] =
∑
xk
′µ(yx<kyxk)
ξ(yx1:k)
µ(yx1:k)
=
∑′
xk
ξ(yx<kyxk)ξ(yx<k)
µ(yx<k)
≤
ξ(yx<k)
µ(yx<k)
= zk−1
∑′
xk
runs over all xk with µ(yx1:k) 6=0. The first equality holds w.µ.p.1. In the second equal-
ity we have used Bayes rule twice. E[zk|x<k]≤zk−1 shows that −zk is a semi-martingale.
Since −zk is non-positive, [Doo53, Th.4.1s(i),p324] implies that −zk converges for k→∞
to a finite value w.µ.p.1. ⊓⊔
6 Markov Decision Processes
From all possible environments, Markov (decision) processes are probably the most inten-
sively studied ones. To give an example, we apply Theorems 4 and 7 to ergodic Markov
decision processes, but we will be very brief.
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Definition 3 (Ergodic Markov Decision Processes) We call µ a (stationary)Markov
Decision Process (mdp) if the probability of observing xk ∈X , given history yx<kyk does
only depend on the last action yk∈Y and the last observation xk−1, i.e. if µ(yx<kykxk)=
µ(yxk−1xk). In this case xk is called a state, X the state space, and µ(yxk−1xk) the tran-
sition matrix. An mdp µ is called ergodic if there exists a policy under which every state
is visited infinitely often with probability 1. Let MMDP be the set of mdps and MMDP1
be the set of ergodic mdps. If an mdp µ(yxk−1xk) is independent of the action yk−1 it is
a Markov process, if it is independent of the last observation xk−1 it is an i.i.d. process.
Stationary mdps µ have stationary optimal policies pµ mapping the same state / obser-
vation xt always to the same action yt. On the other hand a mixture ξ of mdps is itself
not an mdp, i.e. ξ 6∈MMDP , which implies that p
ξ is, in general, not a stationary policy.
The definition of ergodicity given here is least demanding, since it only demands on the
existence of a single policy under which the Markov process is ergodic. Often, stronger
assumptions, e.g. that every policy is ergodic or that a stationary distribution exists, are
made. We now show that there are self-optimizing policies for the class of ergodic mdps
in the following sense.
Theorem 8 (Self-optimizing policies for ergodic mdps) There exist self-optimizing
policies p˜m for the class of ergodic mdps in the sense that
i) ∃p˜m∀ν∈MMDP1 :
1
m
V ∗ν1m−
1
m
V p˜mν1m ≤ cνm
−1/3 m→∞−→ 0,
where cν are some constants. In the discounted case, if the discount sequence γk has
unbounded effective horizon heffk
k→∞
−→∞, then there exist self-optimizing policies p˜ik for the
class of ergodic mdps in the sense that
ii) ∃p˜ik∀ν∈MMDP1 : V
p˜ikν
kγ
k→∞
−→ V ∗νkγ if
γk+1
γk
→ 1.
There is much literature on constructing and analyzing self-optimizing learning algorithms
inmdp environments. The assumptions on the structure of the mdps vary, all include some
form of ergodicity, often stronger than Definition 3, demanding that the Markov process is
ergodic under every policy. See, for instance, [KV86, Ber95]. We will only briefly outline
one algorithm satisfying Theorem 8 without trying to optimize performance.
Proof idea: For (i) one can choose a policy p˜m which performs (uniformly) random
actions in cycles 1...k0−1 with 1≪k0≪m and which follows thereafter the optimal policy
based on an estimate of the transition matrix T ass′≡ν(ass
′) from the initial k0−1 cycles.
The existence of an ergodic policy implies that for every pair of states sstart,s∈X there
is a sequence of actions and transitions of length at most |X |−1 such that state s is
reached from state sstart. The probability that the “right” transition occurs is at least
Tmin with Tmin being the smallest non-zero transition probability in T . The probability
that a random action is the “right” action is at least |Y|−1. So the probability of reaching
a state s in |X |−1 cycles via a random policy is at least (Tmin/|Y|)
|X |−1. In state s
action a is taken with probability |Y|−1 and leads to state s′ with probability T ass′ ≥
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Tmin. Hence, the expected number of transitions s
a
→ s′ to occur in the first k0 cycles
is ≥ k0
|X |
(Tmin/|Y|)
|X |∼ k0.
6 The accuracy of the frequency estimate Tˆ ass′ of T
a
ss′ hence is
∼ k
−1/2
0 . Similar mdps lead to “similar” optimal policies, which lead to similar values.
More precisely, one can show that Tˆ−T ∼k
−1/2
0 implies the same accuracy in the average
value, i.e. | 1
m
V p˜mνk0m −
1
m
V ∗νk0m|∼k
−1/2
0 , where p˜m is the optimal policy based on Tˆ and ∗ is
the optimal policy based on T (=ν). Since 1
m
V1k0∼
k0
m
, (i) follows (with probability 1) by
setting k0∼m
2/3. The policy p˜m can be derandomized, showing (i) for sure.
The discounted case (ii) can be proven similarly. The history yx<k is simply ignored and
the analogue tom→∞ is heffk →∞ for k→∞, which is ensured by
γk+1
γk
→∞. Let p˜ik be the
policy which performs (uniformly) random actions in cycles k...k0−1 with k≪k0≪h
eff
k
and which follows thereafter the optimal policy7 based on an estimate Tˆ of the transition
matrix T from cycles k...k0−1. The existence of an ergodic policy, again, ensures that
the expected number of transitions s
a
→s′ occurring in cycles k...k0−1 is proportional to
∆:=k0−k. The accuracy of the frequency estimate Tˆ of T is ∼∆
−1/2 which implies
V p˜ikνk0γ → V
∗ν
k0γ for ∆ = k0 − k →∞, (11)
where p˜ik is the optimal policy based on Tˆ and ∗ is the optimal policy based on T (=ν). It
remains to show that the achieved reward in the random phase k...k0−1 gives a negligible
contribution to Vkγ. The following implications for k→∞ are easy to show:
γk+1
γk
→ 1 ⇒
γk+∆
γk
→ 1 ⇒
Γk+∆
Γk
→ 1 ⇒
1
Γk
k0−1∑
i=k
γiri ≤
rmax
Γk
[Γk+∆ − Γk]→ 0.
Since convergence to zero is true for all fixed finite ∆ it is also true for sufficiently slowly
increasing ∆(k)→∞. This shows that the contribution of the first ∆ rewards rk+...+rk0−1
to Vkγ is negligible. Together with (11) this shows V
p˜ikν
kγ →V
∗ν
kγ for k0 :=k+∆(k).⊓⊔
The conditions Γk<∞ and
γk+1
γk
→1 on the discount sequence are, for instance, satisfied
for γk =1/k
2, so the Theorem is not vacuous. The popular geometric discount γk = γ
k
fails the latter condition; it has finite effective horizon. [Hut00] gives a detailed account
on discount and horizon issues, and motivates heffk →∞ philosophically.
Together with Theorems 4 and 7, Theorem 8 immediately implies that policy pξ is self-
optimizing for the class of to ergodic mdps.
Corollary 1 (Policy pξ is self-optimizing for ergodic mdps) IfM is a finite or count-
able class of ergodic mdps, and ξ() :=
∑
ν∈Mwνν(), then policies p
ξ
m maximizing V
pξ
1m and
pξ maximizing V piξkγ are self-optimizing in the sense that
∀ν∈M : 1
m
V p
ξ
mν
1m
m→∞
−→ 1
m
V ∗ν1m and V
pξν
kγ
k→∞
−→ V ∗νkγ if
γk+1
γk
→ 1.
If M is finite, then the speed of the first convergence is at least O(m−1/3).
6For T a
ss′
=0 the estimate Tˆ a
ss′
=0 is exact.
7For non-geometric discounts as here, optimal policies are, in general, not stationary.
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7 Conclusions
Summary: We studied agents acting in general probabilistic environments with rein-
forcement feedback. We only assumed that the true environment µ belongs to a known
class of environments M, but is otherwise unknown. We showed that the Bayes-optimal
policy pξ based on the Bayes-mixture ξ=
∑
ν∈Mwνν is Pareto-optimal and self-optimizing
if M admits self-optimizing policies. The class of ergodic mdps admitted self-optimizing
policies w.r.t. the average value and w.r.t. the discounted value if the effective horizon
grew indefinitely.
Continuous classes M: There are uncountably many (ergodic) mdps. Since we have
restricted our development to countable classes M we had to give the Corollary for a
countable subset of MMDP1. We may choose M as the set of all ergodic mdps with
rational (or computable) transition probabilities. In this case M is a dense subset of
MMDP1 which is, from a practical point of view, sufficiently rich. On the other hand, it
is possible to extend the theory to continuously parameterized families of environments
µθ and ξ=
∫
wθµθ dθ. Under some mild (differentiability and existence) conditions, most
results of this work remain valid in some form, especially Corollary 1 for all ergodic mdps.
Bayesian self-optimizing policy: Policy pξ with unbounded effective horizon for er-
godic mdps is the first purely Bayesian self-optimizing consistent policy for ergodic mdps.
The policies of all previous approaches were either hand crafted, like the ones in the proof
of Theorem 8, or were Bayesian with a pre-chosen horizon m, or with geometric dis-
counting γ with finite effective horizon (which does not allow self-optimizing policies)
[KV86, Ber95]. The combined conditions Γk <∞ and
γk+1
γk
→ 1 allow a consistent self-
optimizing Bayes-optimal policy based on mixtures.
Bandits: Bandits are a special subclass of ergodic mdps. In a two-armed bandit prob-
lem you pull repeatedly one of two levers resulting in a gain of A$1 with probability pi
for arm number i. The game can be described as an mdp with parameters pi. If the pi
are unknown, Corollary 1 shows that policy pξ yields asymptotically optimal payoff. The
discounted unbounded horizon approach and result is, to the best of our knowledge, even
new when restricted to Bandits.
Other environmental classes: Bandits, i.i.d. processes, classification tasks, and many
more are all special (degenerate) cases of ergodic mdps, for which Corollary 1 shows that
pξ is self-optimizing. But the existence of self-optimizing policies is not limited to (sub-
classes of ergodic) mdps. Certain classes of pomdps, kth order ergodic mdps, factorizable
environments, repeated games, and prediction problems are not mdps, but neverthe-
less admit self-optimizing policies (to be shown elsewhere), and hence the corresponding
Bayes-optimal mixture policy pξ is self-optimizing by Theorems 4 and 7.
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Outlook: Future research could be the derivation of non-asymptotic bounds, possibly
along the lines of [Hut01]. To get good bounds one may have to exploit extra properties
of the environments, like the mixing rate of mdps [KS98]. Another possibility is to search
for other performance criteria along the lines of [Hut00, Ch.6], especially for the universal
prior [Sol78] and for the Speed prior [Sch02]. Finally, instead of convergence of the
expected reward sum, studying convergence with high probability of the actual reward
sum would be interesting.
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